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Waves and determinants in the activity of Mergers and Acquisitions: 
The Case of Latin America 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper contributes to the current literature of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) by 
studying the existence of waves and the determinants of M&A activity in the economies of 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. From a sample of 2,490 M&As 
announcements reported by Thomson One for these countries, and applying the methodology 
proposed by Harford (2005), evidence of M&A waves is found for the periods 1993-2002 and 
2003-2010 as reported for other regions in various international studies. After controlling for 
economic and business environment variables, as well as for profitability and book-to-market 
variables at industry level, we find evidence in favor of the neoclassical theory as a main 
explanation for M&As, but not for the misvaluation effect. For this purpose, a Prais-Winsten 
data model with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) is used, and the results are confirmed 
through a negative binomial panel data estimation.  
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This study shows evidence consistent in favoring the neoclassical hypothesis as a fundamental 
motivation for carrying out operations of M&As, but not for an alternative hypothesis based on 
misvaluation. 
Evidence has been provided of waves of M&A activity for the periods 1993-2002 and 2003-
2010 seemingly contemporaneous with M&A waves reported for the markets of the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Europe and Asia.  
Additionally, the activity of M&As in Latin American economies was found to be affected by 
macroeconomic, business environment and industry profitability variables, that in agreeing 
with the neoclassical hypothesis, indicate that the M&As correspond with a rational search for 






Two main hypotheses have been proposed to explain Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As). 
First, the neoclassical hypothesis explains M&As by fundamental reasons  like the search for 
economies of scale, economies of vertical integration, combination of complementary 
resources, elimination of inefficiencies, industry consolidation, or profitable opportunities of 
growth (Brealey and Myers, 2003). Second, an alternative hypothesis explains M&As by 
three types of arguments:  taking advantage of distortions on firm valuation (Harford, 2005), 
empire building (Jensen, 1986) or hubris on the part of the acquiring management (Roll, 
1986). These hypotheses have been studied in international markets, but not in Latin America.  
In this study we put to test the two competing hypothesis by modeling both the 
macroeconomic and industry-specific determinants of M&As in Latin America. Our sample 
includes 2,391 announcements of M&As in six Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, México and Perú, in the period 1995 to 2010, taken from Thompson One.  
Following most of the literature, we employ a  Prais-Winsten panel data with panel corrected 
standard errors (PCSE). Additionally we check the robustness of the results with a panel data 
negative binomial counting model, that allows for a more realistic modeling of the depending 
variable, number of M&As per year (Alba, Park & Wang, 2009; Hijzen, Görg & Manchin, 
2008).  
The models consistently show evidence supporting the neoclassical model as the fundamental 
motivation for M&A activity in Latin America. We found that macro economic variables like 
interest rate, GDP growth and unemployment, appear significant and with the predicted sign. 
That’s also true for business environment variables, like indexes of business freedom and tax 
freedom. Moreover, profitability measures at industry level also show a relationship with 
higher M&A deals. This holds on alternative specifications of the panel linear data, as well as 
in the alternative counting model.  
We obtain further evidence of the neoclassical hypothesis driving M&A activity in Latin 
America. Consistent with the role of macro fundamental factors, we find that M&As in Latin 
America happen in waves. Using the methodology of Harford (2005) we find evidence of two 
M&A waves, the first between 1993-2002, and the second 2003-2010. Those are concurrent 
with waves of M&As in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and Asia (Martynova 
and Renneboog, 2008), suggesting that worldwide macroeconomic and business environment 
changes are a main driver of M&A activity in the region. Taken together, the results portray 
economic factors to be determinant of M&As in Latin America, supporting the neoclassical 
hypothesis. 
In contrast, industry-specific variables that proxy for misvaluation, like the level and 
dispersion of the Book-to-market ratio, show almost no significance in alternative 
specifications. This observation fails to provide support for the misvaluation argument 
included in the alternative hypothesis.  
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The fact that the neoclassical hypothesis explains M&As in Latin America, but the alternative 
hypothesis does not, can be explained by looking at the literature of Corporate Governance on 
these markets. The presence of some of the Corporate Governance issues identified in Latin 
America, like cross property, different voting rights, and high property concentration on listed 
firms, prevents that M&As can be used as a mechanism of market discipline on poorly run 
companies (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999). In agreement with that, we note 
that none of the deals compiled in Thomson One for the six Latin American markets 
corresponds to a hostile takeover, and most of the deals were paid by cash.   
The volume of announcements of mergers and acquisitions in Latin American economies has 
experienced a surge in the last 20 years. In the period between 1995 and 2010, M&A activity, 
measured as the number of announcements, grew by 67.4% while in Latin America grew by 
198.8% . The search for new markets and the need to confront the challenges of a global 
market has motivated international companies, both from developed and LA countries, to 
expand in the region.  
One advantage of focusing on Latin American M&As, is the variety of macroeconomic, 
business environment and industry specific variables, in a region with obvious similarities in 
legal origin, business culture, and governance issues across countries. Thus, Latin America 
offers an ideal setting to test for the drivers of M&As in panel data models.  In addition, they 
present a structure of highly concentrated property (Benavides, 2005). These conditions can 
generate potentially different results between the markets already studied and the Latin 
American market. 
This study is organized in the following manner: In the second section, literature regarding 
waves of M&As and the determinants of this activity are examined. In the third section, the 
hypothesis for verifying this study is put forward. In the fourth and fifth sections, the data and 
methodology employed are described, respectively. Finally, in the sixth section proofs are 
presented and results discussed. The work is concluded in the last section. 
2. Background 
 
Companies use M&As as part of the strategic plans to expand their operations, enter new 
markets and increase their competiveness in a globalised market (Brealey and Myers, 2003).  
Constituting a complex phenomenon in their motivation just as in their results, M&As have 
been studied from different perspectives.  Some studies have principally focused on 
examining the economic and financial implications (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 2003; Rossy and Volpin, 2004; Di Giovanni, 2005) managerial incentives of M&A 
deals (Roll, 1986; Jensen, 1986; Kosnik and Shapiro, 1997; Wang, Sakr, Ning and Davidson, 
2010).  Additionally, studies of events have tested the reaction of both the acquirer and the 
target price upon the announcement of the deals (Eckbo, 1983; Eckbo and Langohr, 1989; 
Bhagat, Dong, Hirshleifer and Noah, 2005). Alternatively, different authors have been 
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interested by the long term behavior of a company`s performance after an operation of M&As 
(Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Cosh and Guest, 2001; Bradley and Sundaram, 2004) 
Studies of the determinants of M&As suggest that specific characteristics of both companies 
as well as macro variables of the target country are relevant to the decision (Andrade, 
Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001; Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Di Giovanni, 2005; Kamaly, 2007; 
Piñeiro, Chaitanya and Tamazian, 2008). Similarly, the levels of accounting regulation, 
protection of the investor’s rights and protection of the foreign investment increase the 
probability of M&As in given country (Pablo, 2009; Erel, Liao and Weisbach, 2010). Besides, 
factors such as distance and culture partially explain the distribution of M&A activity across 
countries (Angwin, 2001; Aybar and Ficici, 2009; Hattari and Rajan, 2010). Additionally, the 
literature identifies periods of high activity of M&As, in what is known as “waves of M&As” 
(Martynova and Renneboog, 2008).  
Figure1.Waves of M&As for the United States between the period 1897-2002 (total number of deals). 
Source: (Martynova & Renneboog, 2008) 
In Figure 1, the periodicity in the evolution of the activity of M&As between 1897 to 2001 in 
the United States can be observed. The periods that have been identified as waves of M&As 
stand out. In their study, Golbe and White (1993) model the time-series behavior of M&As in 
United States between 1895 and 1989 using sinusoidal curve to approximate the wave-like 
pattern.   
In this respect, the literature has been able to relate each episode of waves of M&As with 
economic, political and/or regulation changes, as well as with periods of overvaluation in the 
stock market. The first wave known as “Horizontal Integration”, occurred at the end of the 
19th century, between the years 1897 and 1903 in the United States and coincided with a 
phase of economic expansion and the development of the Stock Exchange in New York 
(NYSE). The second wave, called “Vertical Integration”, came about in the United States in 
the period 1910 to 1929 related to the economic recovery after the First World War and 
changes to the anti-monopolies law in the United States. The third wave, “the Conglomeration 
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Era”, has been identified in the United States, the United Kingdom and Europe between 1950 
and 1973 and arose with the economic recovery after the Second World War and new laws of 
promoting competition (anti-trust) in the United States. The fourth wave, the so-called 
“Industry Transformation”, reported in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and 
Asia in the period 1981 to 1989, began with the recovery from the 70’s recession and with the 
development of new financial tools. Finally, the fifth wave, known as “Megafusions”, came 
about in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and Asia between 1993 and 2001. 
This wave is contemporaneous with the boom in financial markets, and has been associated 
with breakthroughs in information technology, and the acceleration of processes of 
globalization, state deregulation and privatizations. (Davidson, 2003; Martynova and 
Renneboog, 2008).  
Pioneering studies in Latin America regarding M&As are that of Fuenzalida, Mongrut, Nash, 
and Tapia (2006) that look to identify the existence of abnormal returns in the value of 
purchased companies (targets), on the public announcement of offers of acquisition in Latin 
American countries; Corredor, Pombo and Corredor (2009) that study the influence of 
corporate government indicators in the probability that M&As are carried out in Colombia; 
and Pablo (2009) that identifies the determinants of mergers and transnational acquisitions in 
Latin American countries. We don’t know of any study of M&As waves in Latin America.   
Two main hypothesis have been proposed to explain the determinants of M&A activity. The 
neoclassical hypothesis suggests that the waves of M&As are a response to structural changes 
at industry level such as new regulations, changes in cost structure and technological 
innovations (industry shocks). Specifically, Gort (1969), Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and 
Hartford (2005) argue that the shocks and structural changes in industries require the 
redistribution of assets to more productive uses, for example, in the form of M&As.  In the 
same vein, a positive shock in the demand of an industry increases the cost of opportunity for 
an inefficient producer, in consequence, the assets will be relocalized in the search for greater 
productivity (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001). In this respect Nelson (1959) finds that 
economic growth and the business cycle are related to the activity of M&As.  
Finally, Harford (2005) presents evidence of M&As waves throughout the economy as a 
response to structural shocks that affect various industries at the same time, conditioned to the 
existence of sufficient liquidity to finance the deals. 
Under the term “Alternative hypothesis” we include three alternative explanations to the 
neoclassical paradigm and efficient markets for M&A activity, namely: misvaluation, empire 
building and hubris.  First, Shleifer and Vishny (2003)  postulate that M&As are a 
consequence of rational management decisions taking advantage of irrational or erroneous 
valuations (misvaluations) on the market. In this context, the targets tend to be more 
undervalued than their acquirers. In this way, the market overvaluations could be linked to 
M&As waves, as argued by Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004). As evidence to support 
this, the authors find a positive relation between the dispersion on the ratios of the companies 
in an industry ( p.e. the price-to-book ratio) and M&As waves. Supporting this explanation, 
Mueller, Gugler, and Weichselbaumer (2011) find that peaks in activity of M&As are limited 
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exclusively to companies listed on the stock exchange, and coincide with peaks of booms in 
the stock market, which can´t be explained by the neoclassical hypothesis 
Second, M&As can be motivated by the benefits that management extract of running a larger 
firm, instead of sound fundamental reasons, in what is called “empire building” (Jensen, 
1986; Martynova y and Renneboog, 2008). In this respect, Mueller (1969) argues that ill-
monitored managers might embark in mergers and adquisictions for the sake of maximizing 
the company size, regardless of any value creation or destruction for the shareholders.  
Third, Roll (1986) offers a theory in which management is irrational, and assumes incorrectly 
that its valuations are better than those of the market.  In this case,  activity of  M&As is 





The literature summarized above is the basis for the following hypothesis with respect to the 
activity of M&As in Latin American economies: 
Hypothesis 1: In Latin American economies there is evidence of M&As waves, as in other 
regions of the world. Martynova and Renneboog (2008), compile studies regarding waves of 
M&As in the markets of the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and Asia; in 
addition, the research of Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and Harford (2005) document waves 
of M&As in the United States; and Mueller, Gugler, and Weichselbaumer (2011)  for the 
United States, the United Kingdom and Europe. Inasmuch as  M&As in Latin America are 
mostly explained by large scale structural changes and macroeconomic conditions, some of 
worldwide reach, we should expect M&A activity in the region to happen in waves.   
Hypothesis 2: The M&A activity in Latin American countries is affected by macroeconomic 
and industry-specific factors.. Stigler (1950), Gort (1969), Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), 
Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) and Harford (2005) find evidence of economic factors 
as an important motivation for M&As, as implied by the neoclassical hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 3: The M&A activity in Latin American countries is affected by distortions in the 
valuation of the companies in stock markets. In the Alternative hypothesis, Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan (2004) and Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan,(2005) show the 
dispersion of firm market value with respect to their fundamental value as a determinant of 
M&A activity at industry-level. Additionally, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) present a model in 





The information concerning M&As announcements for six Latin American countries: 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico y Peru, from 1993 to 2010, obtained from the 
database Thomson One2. This database, provided by Thomson Financial’s Securities Data 
Company (SDC), contains information on the activity of M&As from countries around the 
world since 1985 and is referenced in the majority of works on M&As (p.e.: Rhodes-Kropf, 
Robinson, and Viswanathan, 2005; Harford, 2005 and Mueller Gugler and Weichselbaumer, 
2011). Thomson One provide relevant details of the M&As, like the date of announcement, 
name of both the acquirer and the target, their SIC code (Standard Industry Classification), 
their home country, the percentage of participation looked for in the deal, method of payment 
and type of negotiation (hostile or friendly). As usual, from the sample are excluded leveraged 
buyouts (LBOs), spin-offs, recapitalizations, repurchases, and privatizations3. Excluded are 
industries strictly regulated and/or with special accounting, specifically financial services, 
utilities, education and health. Additionally, deals where the percentage of participation 
looked for by the bidder is less than 5% are discarded.  
Financial and market information for individual companies is compiled from the Economática 
database, which includes most of the companies registered in the stock markets of the 
countries studied. From this database, we obtained consolidated financial statements in 
dollars, name of the company and industry classification for the period 1995 to 20104. 
The macroeconomic variables and the business environment gradings, were taken from 
several sources: Bloomberg, World Bank, Political Risk Services Group and the Heritage 
Foundation. For the information regarding the regulation of the countries considered were 
consulted The Economist Intelligence Unit, and the regulatory agency in each country. 
Applying the described selection criteria, we obtain a sample of 2,490 announcements of 
M&As, that correspond to 90% of the activity in total Latin America, reported by Thomson 
One. As detailed in Table 1, 43.5% of the deals took place in Brazil 15.1% in Argentina with 
15.1%, 14.4% in Mexico, 11.0% in Chile , 8.4% in Colombia and finally 7.6% in Perú.  
Table 1. Number of announcements of M&As in Latin American countries (1993-2010) 
 
Source: own elaboration – Thomson One information 
                                                          
2
 For the majority of industries in Colombia and Peru, the database contains of M&A deals starting only from 
1993.  
3Privatizations are excluded, since, despite sharing some determining factors with the processes of M&As, for 
being, in most part, an instrument of economic policy (Megginson, Nash, and Van Randerborgh, 1994; 
Megginson and Netter, 2001).   
4
 The difference in the periods taken for the identification of waves and determinants of activity is due to the lack 
of accounting data before 1995. 
País 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total %
Argentina 5 9 18 21 44 48 26 39 12 11 6 11 13 20 28 18 17 31 377 15.14%
Brazil 9 9 20 36 41 53 57 86 58 34 16 36 36 60 151 170 94 117 1083 43.49%
Chile 2 12 8 5 17 10 30 17 18 9 5 19 9 10 25 19 22 37 274 11.00%
Colombia 1 3 9 9 9 21 10 11 8 2 2 6 15 10 18 17 22 37 210 8.43%
Mexico 15 21 18 15 25 21 19 28 19 21 14 17 11 21 22 14 19 38 358 14.38%
Peru 3 10 12 15 3 6 15 10 15 3 3 9 4 12 19 10 11 28 188 7.55%
Total 35 64 85 101 139 159 157 191 130 80 46 98 88 133 263 248 185 288 2490 100.00%
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Starting from 1993, a growing tendency is observed in of the total number of M&As, 
interrupted in 2001. According to the report presented by the Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (CEPAL, 2002), the financial turbulence associated to the terrorist 
attacks on September 11, 2001 affected Latin American markets via the reduction in direct 
foreign investment flows from the United States and Europe. This added to the instability 
already generated by the regional financial crisis of Brazil in 1999 and that of Argentina in 
2001, seems to have toned down the activity of M&As in the region. Since 2003 M&A 
activity in the region has steadily grown, sharply falling in 2009, in the aftermath of the 
financial and economic crisis of 2008. For 2010 the growth in announcements of M&As was 
55.67%, recovering the levels of 2008 . 
 
 
Table 2 reports the number of announcements of M&As depending on the procedence of the 
acquirer. In the period of study, 53% of the announcements correspond to national acquirers, 
5.2% to acquirers came from the region, and the rest come from outside Latinamerica.  
Table 2. Number of announcements of M&As for national and regional acquirers and for other countries  
 
Source: own elaboration–Thomson One information 
 
As presented in Table 3, 71.65% of all M&As announcements are between companies that 
operate in the same industry (focalization)6, while the rest correspond to interindustry deals, 
pursuing diversification or vertical integration. Finally, upon reviewing the method of 
payment it is found that for the M&As with available deal details, the principal method of 
payment is cash.  Table 3 offers more details about the reported information.  
Table 3. Number of announcements of M&As for strategy (focalization vs. interindustry) and method of 
payment     
 
Source: Own elaboration – Information Thomson One 
                                                          
6We define as focalization the set of M&As between companies with the same first two digits of the SIC code, 
following Martynova and Renneboog (2006). Table A of the Appendix details the classification.  
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total %
21 22 33 42 54 75 59 84 87 50 23 53 54 64 157 172 106 163 1319 52.97%
Regional 1 7 6 5 4 6 8 9 1 3 2 4 3 9 18 12 9 22 129 5.18%
others 13 35 46 54 81 78 90 98 42 27 21 41 31 60 88 64 70 103 1042 41.85%





M&A Type 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total %
Focalización 23 37 62 70 102 115 109 126 92 55 34 73 71 99 198 187 132 199 1784 71.65%
Diversification 12 27 23 31 37 44 48 65 38 25 12 25 17 34 65 61 53 89 706 28.35%
Paid on cash 8 19 34 48 73 73 62 77 36 32 26 42 30 49 116 81 60 101 967 38.84%
Paid on stocks 2 5 11 14 3 5 8 26 8 2 1 11 21 12 8 9 19 25 190 7.63%
Paid on stocks and cash 5 0 2 1 4 4 5 5 15 0 5 3 3 10 13 10 5 19 109 4.38%
not especified 20 40 38 38 59 77 82 83 71 46 14 42 34 62 126 148 101 143 1224 49.16%




5.1 Identifiying waves of M&As  
We begin testing for waves on M&A activity in Latin America following the methodology 
proposed by Harford (2005). As in that paper, given the decrease in activity between 2002 
and 2003 (Figure 2), the sample is divided into two subperiods: 1993 to 2002 and 2003 to 
2010. Starting from the M&As universe described above,  the deals are grouped by country 
and economic sector in a quarterly basis. Then, each subperiod is divided into non-
overlapping windows of two years. The methodology calls for identifying the window of two 
years  with the greatest number of M&As, and testing through Simulation by Boostrapping.  
If that two-year window presents a statistically significant high number of deals compared 




Figure 2. Announcements of M&As for countries in the period 1993-2010 
 
Source: Own elaboration – Information Thomson One 
5.2 Econometric model and description of variables 
An unbalanced panel data model is used to tests for the determinants of M&A activity against 
economic environment, business environment and industry variables. We include as 
explanatory variables of the economic environment the interest rate (IR), the unemployment 
rate (UN), the GDP and the country risk (CR). The business environment variables are the 
business freedom index (BUS_FREE), the fiscal freedom index (FISCAL_FREE) and changes 
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Hypothesis (H2), following Stigler (1950), Gort (1969), Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), Rossy 
and Volpin (2004) and Pablo (2009).  Finally, we include the following industry variables to 
test for some implications of the alternative hypothesis (H3): the return on assets (ROA) the 
Market-to-Book ratio (MTB) and Intra-industry standard deviation of the MTB. The 
definition, description and expected sign for each variable, is detailed in Table C of the 
Appendix. Additionally, to control for endogeneity, all explanatory variables are found 
lagging behind a period, following Harford (2005) and Kamaly (2007). 
The dependent variable is calculated applying a logarithmic transformation on the number of 
announcements of M&As by industry-country-year, as follows: 
 = ln	(1 + 		&) 
Similar transformations have been employed by Di Giovanni (2005), Wang (2008) and 
Piñeiro, Chaitanya and Tamazian (2008), in studies of determinants of M&A activity. 
 
 
The customary tests are performed to assure a proper specification. The Lagrange 
Multiplicator test by Breusch and Pagan discards a Pooled OLS in favor of Random Effects. 
In turn, the Hausman test rejects Random effects in favor of Fixed Effects. Finally, given that 
econometric proofs indicate the presence of autocorrelation and of heteroscedasticity, a Prais-
Winsten model is estimated with Panel Corrected Standard Errors ( PCSE) with the following 
specification7: 
 =  + ,
  +  
 
     =  , + !  
 
Where, t is the year , i represents industry, c indicates country,	  is the  measure of M&A 
activity, ′, is the matrix of explanatory variables,  is the  industry-country effect and 
 is the error. The model is estimated at industry-country level, at annual frequency, from 
1995 to 2010, since most of the explanatory variables are only available beginning from 1995.  
 
Country-industries with too few M&As were discarded using a Pareto analysis. Neither were 
included industries where accounting information was not available. The industries finally 
selected were metallic minerals, petroleum and natural gas, food, chemical products, 
machinery, transport equipment, commercial services and engineering and administration 
services, corresponding with the most dynamic industries of the economy in the Latin 
American countries.   
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6.1 Waves of M&As in Latin American economies  
 
Table 4. Waves of M&As in the period 1993-2002 by economic sector.  
 
*, ** and *** represent significance at 90%, 95% and 99% respectively 
Upon applying the Hartford (2005) Methodology for the first half of the sample, 1993 to 
2002, six of the eight sectors present waves of M&As, identified in the table as shady periods, 
concentrated mostly between 1997 to 2000, as presented in Table 4.  The M&A waves can be 
linked to economic and regulatory changes in the region. In this period, Latin American 
companies faced increased conditions of global competition, as well as significant economic 
changes that transformed the region. Specifically, between 1986 and 1992 Latin American 
governments carried out a series of reforms in programs of economic liberalization and 
globalization, including adoption of policies of macroeconomic stability8, as well as 
privatization programs in economic sectors like public services, mining, finance, among 
others (Mustajo, 2000; Garcia, 2003). Along with privatizations, the regulation in those 
sectors was reformed with the aim of attracting foreign investors and improving the level of 
competition (Estache and Trujillo, 2004). For example, barriers were eliminated to the entry 
of foreign investment in the financial sector, motivating international banks to set up 
subsidiaries in the region by means of M&As (García and Gómez, 2009). 
Table 5. Waves of M&As in the period 2003-2010 
 
*, ** and *** represent significance to 90%, 95% and 99% respectively 
For the second half of the sample, 2003 to 2010, four of the eight productive sectors present 
waves of M&As between 2007 and 2010, as reported in Table 5. According to the CEPAL 
(2005), starting from 2004 the recovery of the economies of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico 
                                                          
8As for example, the adoption of monetary policies like that of “inflation objective” used widely in Latin 
America in the last three decades. 
1 2 3 4 5
1993-1994 1995-1996 1997-1998 1999-2000 2001-2002
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing 3 2 2 5 4 0.495
Commerce 10 10 26 25 13 0.207
Construction 0 2 3 1 6 0.033**
Finance, Insurance & Real Estate 19 34 71 56 45 0.023**
Mining 9 21 12 12 10 0.057*
Manufacturing 36 86 111 103 52 0.037**
Services 8 11 36 64 28 <0.001***
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas & Sanitary Services 14 20 37 82 52 0.026**
Sector 
M&A announcements per 2-year window
P-Value 
1 2 3 4
2003-2004 2005-2006 2007-2008 2009-2010
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing 2 1 10 13 0.105
Commerce 6 11 42 35 0.025**
Construction 1 1 10 12 0.119
Finance, Insurance & Real Estate 24 36 102 107 0.057*
Mining 23 27 54 73 0.028**
Manufacturing 40 64 118 112 0.124
Services 16 35 126 63 0.002***
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas & Sanitary Services 32 46 49 58 0.225
Sector 




motivated the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) activity in Latin-America. The growing trend 
was maintained until the end of 2008, when the financial crisis and the subsequent fu nding 
restrictions caused the M&A activity to taper off. However, since the fourth quarter of 2009 
to 2010, an important recovery of M&A activity has been reported (Thomson Reuters, 2010). 
Furthermore, the greater part of the concentration of announcements is found in the window 
2009-2010, which suggests the possibility that in the region a new wave of M&A activity was 
forming at the time. 
 
In short, upon analyzing the activity of Latin American M&As in the sample from 1993 to 
2010, we found evidence of waves in agreement with H1.  They seem related with economics 
and regulatory changes in the region, such as reported in studies carried out in the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Europe and Asia. A formal test of those relations is provided 
below by the estimation of the panel data model 
 
6.2 Determinants of M&As in Latin American economies  
We run different specifications of the PCES Prais-Winsten model (1) to estimate the 
determinants of M&As in Latin America, the results of which are reported in Table 6. As 
mentioned above, the model includes macroeconomic and business environment variables, as 
well as industry specific variables to test both the neoclassical and the alternative hypothesis. 
According to the results reported in column 1, the country economic and business 
environment  seems to have an important impact on the activity of M&As. To begin with, a 
negative and significant coefficient of the interest rate (IR) can be interpreted as greater 
interest rates implying less M&A activity.  This result coincides with Pablo (2009) who 
argues that lower rates of interest are signs of a better economic environment in the countries, 
and also with Harford (2005), who interprets it as a proxy of costs of transaction or funding. 
For its part, the rate of unemployment (UN) presents a significant and negative relation with 
the M&A activity. In studies like those of Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and Rau and 
Stouraitis (2009) the rate of unemployment is used as a proxy of economic stability in 
countries, hence this result suggests that a better economic environment makes more M&A 
deals possible. On the other hand, the coefficient of GDP presents a highly significant and 
negative coefficient with the activity of M&As, which have been supported in two ways. On 
one hand, Gort (1969), Brouthers and Brouthers (2000) and Neto, Brandão and Cerqueira 
(2010), indicate that a growth in demand can encourage the establishing of new businesses 
instead of carrying out M&As in a country. On the other hand, a weak economy might be 
favorable to the M&A deals searching consolidation inside an industry, looking for reducing 
costs and a more efficient use of resources (Gugler, Mueller, Yurtoglu and Zulehner, 2003). 
In turn, the estimated coefficient of the the variable risk country (CR) resulted positive and 
highly significant. Given that a greater score signifies a lesser risk, the result agree with the 
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notion that a riskier country will have less activity in M&As, similar to that obtained in other 
studies that have used measures of political risk like Ragozzino (2009) or Bris, Cabolis and 
Janowski (2007).   
To estimate the effect of the business environment in the activity of M&As, proxies the 
business freedom index (BUS_FREE) and the fiscal freedom index (FISCAL_FREE) are 
included in the model. With respect to BUS_FREE, the negative and highly significant 
coefficient suggests that a greater facility for creating and operating new businesses lessens 
the necessity for M&As, promoting greenfield investments. Regarding the second variable, 
FISCAL_FREE, the positive and highly significant coefficient indicates that low tax rates 
increase the activity of M&As, since high tax rates are disincentive for investments,  
especially FDI. A similar result was reported by Di Giovanni (2005) and Agostini and Jalile 
(2009). As an additional measure of the business environment the variable of regulatory 
changes in competition laws in the countries studied (REG). This is a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 in the year of change in the law, 0 otherwise. In this respect, the positive and 
marginally significant coefficient reported, suggest that a regulatory improvement in 
competition increases the M&A activity. Stigler (1950) has already found similar results and 
in a more recent study and Bris, Cabolis and Janowski (2007) reported an increase in the 
activity of M&As after changes in the laws of competition for different countries of the world, 
including Argentina and Mexico. The authors argue that horizontal integrations are a form of 
incorporating efficiencies in industries with low level of concentration. 
Finally, to determine the effect of the world financial crises of 2001 and 2009 in the activity 
of M&As, dummy variables are included (CRISIS1 Y CRISIS2) taking the value of 1 in the 
year of crisis, 0 otherwise. Although the reported negative effect of these variables was 
expected, it didn’t result statistically significant, probably captured by economic environment 
variables. The evidence presented until now indicates that the M&As in Latin America are 
determined by macroeconomic factors that condition their economic viability, in support of  
the neoclassical hypothesis. 




In the Table each coefficient is reported with its respective value-p between parenthesis. The dependent variable was 
calculated as ln[1+ number M&As]. *, ** and *** represent significance to 90%, 95% y 99% respectively. 
In column 2 specific variables for industry are included. The first of these, return on assets 
(ROA), shows a positive and significant impact on the activity of M&As. This result suggest 
that upon considering an integration between companies, the operative efficiencies that can be 
incorporated after the integration are an important incentive, in agreement with the 
neoclassical hypothesis (H2). Harford (2005) obtained a similar result in his research for the 
United States, whereas Pablo (2009) reports a result statistically not significant for Latin 
America. 
On the other hand, upon analyzing the Market to Book ratio (MTB) and the deviation intra-
industry of the same variable (σ_MTB), a significant relation with the activity of M&As is not 
found, as reported in column 3. These two variables have been used in the literature to test for 
the misvaluation explanation (Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan, 2005 y Harford, 
2005). Thus the results don’t support H3 in Latin American economies. Moreover, although 
the interest rate (IR) and the fiscal-free index (FISCAL_FREE) stop being significant in 
column (3), the rest of the economic and business environment variables maintain 




IR c,t-1 -0.0048 -0.0034 -0.0046
(0.037)** (0.170) (0.049)**
UN c,t-1 -0.0256 -0.0225 -0.0270
(0.031)** (0.094)* (0.031)**
GDP c,t-1 -0.0263 -0.0263 -0.0298
(<.0001)*** (0.001)*** (<.0001)***
CR c,t-1 0.0285 0.0266 0.0289
(<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)***
Business environment variables
BUS_FREE c,t-1 -0.0126 -0.0124 -0.0134
(<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)***
FISCAL_FREE c,t-1 0.0097 0.0075 0.0107
(0.046)** (0.173) (0.040)**
REG c,t-1 0.0899 0.0975 0.0857
(0.077)* (0.063)* (0.074)*
CRISIS1 t -0.1117 -0.1161
(0.161) (0.169)
CRISIS2 t -0.0675 -0.0815
(0.383) (0.366)
Industry specific variables 
ROA ic,t-1 0.5905 0.6011 0.2066
(0.065)* (0.070)* (0.007)***
MTB ic,t-1 -0.0004 -0.0002
(0.240) (0.445)
σ_MTB ic,t-1 0.0000 0.0000
(0.700) (0.872)
R2 0.42 0.35 0.45 0.43
Wald chi2 771.23 677.17 851.91 621.25
Prob > chi2 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
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qualitatively the same effect on M&A activity. Finally, in column 4, the coefficients of the 
base model excluding the non-significant variables are reported. Overall, this result suggests 
that the economic and business environment of the country, as well as the operative efficiency 
of the respective industry are important drivers of M&A activity in Latin America, whereas 
misvaluation effects are not. 
 
5.1. Robustness tests 
Next, two robustness tests are run. First, given that the present study finds a negative effect of 
the GDP on M&A activity, in contradiction with some previous studies (Di Giovanni, 2005 
and Pablo, 2009), this effect is further explored employing interactive variables between GDP 
and country dummies. On the other hand, the model is run in two subsets: national and 
transnational M&As, depending on whether the acquirer and target share the same country. In 
Table 7 the findings are summarised. 
In column 1 the results of the base model, already shown in column 3 of Table 6, are 
included.  As can be observed in column 2, upon incorporating the interactive variables, the 
effect of the GDP variables per country keep the negative sign, however, this result is only 
significant for Argentina, Chile and Mexico, whereas the coefficients of the other variables 
result are still consistent with previous reports.   
Column 3 corresponds to the results of the model for the subset of national M&As. The 
results indicate that only the interest rate, the business freedom index and the risk country are 
significant when it comes down to explaining variation in the national M&As. On the other 
hand, the results reported in column 4 belong to the base model run for the transnational 
M&As showing that all economic environment variables of the original model, except the 
interest rate, motivate the activity of this subset of M&As.  
As shown by the results in Table 7, the coefficients of macro and industry determinants of the 
activity of M&As model turn out robust to the alternative specifications, supporting the 
neoclassical hypothesis (H2). On one hand, the negative effect of GDP over the activity of 
M&As is confirmed, for the sample countries, statistically significant for the half of them. On 
the other hand, the effect of most of the variables on the base model is maintained when the 
dependent variable is restricted either to national or transnational M&As  
 




In the Table each coefficient is reported with its respective value-p between parenthesis. The dependent variable was 
calculated as ln[1+ number M&As]. *, ** and *** represent significance to 90%, 95% and 99% respectively. 
Due to the discreteness of the dependent variable, number of M&A deals by industry-country-
year , we run a counting model as an additional robustness test for the determinants of 
M&As9. The marginal effects of a negative binominal counting model for panel data are 
reported in column 2 of table 8. For convenience, column 1 reproduces the estimations of the 
                                                          
9The most common of them is the Poisson regression. However, the negative binomial regression is a more 
flexible alternative that doesn’t assume that the mean and the variance are the same (Cámeron and Trivedi, 
2005). In fact, the Poisson model is found inadequate by the overdispersion-in-variance test. Instead, the 
negative binomial regression model generalizes the Poisson model by introducing an unobserved individual 
effect to the variance of the model: #(|%) = %&(′)  and '((|%) = %&(′))1 +
	%&(′)*.   




IR c,t-1 -0.0046 -0.0042 -0.0032 -0.0023
(0.049)** (0.077)* (0.065)** (0.293)
UN c,t-1 -0.0270 -0.0298 0.0065 -0.0290
(0.031)** (0.023)** (0.461) (0.013)**
GDP c,t-1 -0.0298 -0.0082 -0.0270
(<.0001)*** (0.114) (<.0001)***
CR c,t-1 0.0289 0.0294 0.0183 0.0220
(<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Business environment variables
BUS_FREE c,t-1 -0.0134 -0.0133 -0.0083 -0.0089
(<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (0.001)**
FISCAL_FREE c,t-1 0.0107 0.0115 0.0027 0.0049
(0.040)** (0.032)** (0.532) (0.314)
REG c,t-1 0.0857 0.0701 0.0529 0.0425
(0.074)* (0.174) (0.164) (0.359)
Industry specific variables 
ROA ic,t-1 0.2066 0.1989 0.0153 0.2353














R2 0.43 0.42 0.38 0.31
Wald chi2 621.25 615.06 236.04 387.97
Prob > chi2 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
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base model. As is observed in column 2, excepting the unemployment rate, all the variables 
turned out as statistically significant and conserved their sign.   
Table 8. Determinants of M&As, linear panel data model vs. panel data count model.   
  
In the Table each coefficient is reported with its respective value-p between parenthesis. In column (1), the dependent 
variable was calculated as ln[1+ number M&As]. In column (2) the dependent variable is the number of M&As. *, ** and 
*** represent significance at 90%, 95% and 99% respectively. 
6. Conclusions 
We analized the behaviour of announcements of M&As on Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico and Peru. M&A activity in those countries is affected by macroeconomic, 
business environment and industry profitability variables, that in agreeing with the 
neoclassical hypothesis, indicate that the M&As correspond with a rational search for greater 
efficiency in industries and taking advantage of business opportunities.  The systemic nature 
of M&As in the region is reinforced by evidence of waves of M&A activity for the periods 
1993-2002 and 2003-2010. Those waves are contemporaneous with the fifth and sixth M&A 
waves reported for the markets of the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and Asia, 





IR c,t-1 -0.0046 -0.0121181
(0.049)** (0.037)**
UN c,t-1 -0.0270 -0.0519251
(0.031)** (0.124)
GDP c,t-1 -0.0298 -0.0751576
(<.0001)*** (<.0001)***
CR c,t-1 0.0289 0.0774505
(<.0001)*** (<.0001)***
Business environment variables
BUS_FREE c,t-1 -0.0134 -0.0315799
(<.0001)*** (<.0001)***
FISCAL_FREE c,t-1 0.0107 0.0266068
(0.040)** (0.007)***
REG c,t-1 0.0857 0.2584524
(0.074)* (0.030)**
Industry specific variables 
ROA ic,t-1 0.2066 1.127006
(0.007)*** (0.018)**
R2 0.43
Wald chi2 621.25 78.70
Prob > chi2 <.0001 <.0001
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Finally, no evidence was found to favor the alternative hypothesis as a complementary 
explanation in the activity of M&As in the studied countries. Specifically, upon examining 
the level of activity in relation to distortions in the valuation of companies in the stock 
markets, there were no significant statistical results. The absence of a misvaluation effect on 
the M&A activity appears consistent with the typical high ownership concentration detected 
in Latin America’s firms. This, along with other negative corporate governance features in the 
region, might be impeding the use of hostile takeovers as a way to impose market discipline 
in mismanaged companies (La Porta et al, 1999).  Reinforcing this point, we note that none of 
the deals compiled in Thomson One for the six Latin American markets corresponds to a 
hostile takeover, and most of the deals were paid by cash.   
Left for future studies are the analysis of the behavior of M&As in Latin America conditioned 
on the strategy of integration (horizontal, vertical or diversification), and the study of agency 
problems and corporative government associated to M&A deals, as well as the short and long  
term behavior of the performance of companies after M&As. 
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Details the classification according to the code SIC (STANDARD INDUSTRIAL 
CLASSIFICATION) 
Division Sector SIC 
A Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing 01-09 
B Mining 10-14 
C Construction 15-17 
D Manufacturing 20-39 
E Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas & Sanitary 
Services 
40-49 
F-G Commerce 50-59 
H Finance, Insurance & Real Estate 60-65 








IR c,t-1 UN c,t-1 GDP c,t-1 CR c,t-1 BUS_FREE c,t-1FISCAL_FREEROA ic,t-1 MTB ic,t-1 σ_MTB ic,t-1
IR c,t-1 1.0000
UN c,t-1 0.0541 1.0000
GDP c,t-1 -0.1112 -0.2788 1.0000
CR c,t-1 -0.4277 -0.4877 -0.4241 1.0000
BUS_FREE c,t-1 -0.2527 0.3082 -0.1028 0.2645 1.0000
FISCAL_FREE c,t-1 0.1983 0.1672 0.0016 -0.0711 0.2328 1.0000
ROA ic,t-1 -0.0128 -0.0797 0.1123 0.0778 -0.0664 0.0647 1.0000
MTB ic,t-1 0.0512 0.0145 -0.0238 -0.0670 -0.0141 0.0584 -0.0201 1.0000





Definition, description and expected sign for each variable 
Variable Description Source Expected sign 
Dependent    
+ 
Natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of 
M&As at the industry-country level and per 
year 





Explanatory    








Mitchell & Mulherin, 
(1996) 










Is a quantitative measure that represents the 
level of procedures required to start, operate, 
and close a business. The freedom score for 
each country and year is a number between 0 







Is a measure of the tax burden regulated by 
the government in the countries. The freedom 
score for each country per year is a number 
between 0 and 100, with 100 equaling the 





Di Giovanni, (2005) 





Continuation Table C 
Variable Description Source Expected sign 
Explanatory    
83, 
Market to Book Ratio measured at the 
industry-country level and per year. 










Desviation of the Market to Book Ratio in 











Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for 




Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for 




Dummy variable that has a value of 1 if there 
were improvements in competition laws in 







Bris, Cabolis and 
Janowski (2007) 
7-, 
Is the Composite Risk Rating as a measure of 
country risk. The score for each country and 
year is a number between 0 and 100, where 







Bris, Cabolis and 
Janowski (2007) 
-;, 
Return on Assets measured at the industry-
country level and per year. Calculated as an 
average per industry 
Economática, 
own 
calculations  
(+) 
Harford (2005) 
Pablo (2009) 
Own elaboration 
 
